Over In the past few months, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has regained his domestic footing, once again demonstrating an uncanny ability to get away with anything—the secret of his remarkable political longevity. Approval among Israelis on the far right had already been growing since the spring, as he resisted US pressure (if you can call it that) to sign a cease-fire deal with Hamas that would have returned the remaining hostages.
In May, ignoring pleas from Washington, he sent his troops into Rafah and the border region with Egypt, thus eliminating the main appeal a truce would have for Hamas. By then refusing to withdraw from Rafah even temporarily, as recommended by Israel’s military chiefs and Defense Minister Yoav Galant (his arch rival in Likud), Netanyahu sabotaged any serious chance of a deal with the Palestinians. Egypt, meanwhile, was furious that it had lost the supremacy it had until then over the Rafah crossing.
It was Netanyahu, who clearly ignored President Biden, who had no intention of handing him a clean truce complete with freed hostages, including Americans, whose return would offer a welcome White House photo opportunity. And by ungratefully rejecting Biden, he was helping Donald Trump’s campaign. Netanyahu’s calculations did not change when Kamala Harris was replaced as the Democratic nominee: he had good reason to fear that Harris might align more closely with Barack Obama’s Middle East policy than with that of her current boss.
Soon after Netanyahu took office in March 2009, he began working with Republican politicians to complicate matters for Obama, who had entered the Oval Office two months earlier. Years later, he relied on the same scheme when Biden (now president) and the Pentagon began to turn instead to Gallant — welcomed several times in Washington during the Gaza war — and to be more critical of Netanyahu. Republicans invited him to give his fourth address to (…)
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(10) Gilbert Akar with Michelle Varshavski, The 33-Day War: Israel’s War Against Hezbollah in Lebanon and Its AftermathSaqi Books, London, 2007, pp. 47-48.