On his last day in office, James Madison imposed what is perhaps the most significant—and overlooked—presidential veto in history.
This was in response to the Bounty Act in 1817 – an infrastructure bill they called “internal improvements”. In a rare example of both integrity and adherence to the oath, Pres. Madison vetoed the bill, despite the fact that it directly aligned with his long-standing personal political goals.
He chose the constitution, even though he had an easy way out: either sign it or, as Speaker Clay suggested, submit to his successor, James Monroe.
VETO MESSAGE
In his veto message of March 3, 1817, Madison acknowledged his longstanding support for the cause, writing “I am not ignorant of the great importance of roads and canals, and the improved navigation of water-courses, and that the power in the National Legislature to provide them can be exercised with considerable advantage to the general prosperity.”
But for Madison, who had been advocating this kind of federal power for decades—including at the Philadelphia Convention of 1787—the bill had a fatal flaw. It tried to exercise power beyond the strict limits of the Constitution.
His veto message made this clear:
“The legislative powers vested in Congress are specified and enumerated in the eighth section of the first article of the Constitution, and it does not appear that the power proposed to be exercised by the bill is among the enumerated powers, or that it falls under any fair interpretation within the power to make laws necessary and proper to carry out these or other powers conferred by the Constitution on the government of the United States.
Bonus Bill proponents, like many politicians today, used a strategy of molesting the constitution: first, seeking authorization under the Commerce Clause, then, failing that, falling back on the general welfare clause.
But Madison wasn’t convinced either way. Regarding the commerce clause, he wrote:
“Powers to regulate commerce between the several States” cannot include powers to construct roads and canals and to improve the navigation of watercourses for the purpose of facilitating, promoting, and securing such commerce without latitude of construction deviating from the ordinary importation of the conditions heightened by the known inconveniences which undoubtedly led to the vesting of this power of correction in Congress.
Madison also rejected the Common Good Clause argument.
“To attribute the power in question to the clause “to provide for the common defense and general welfare” would be contrary to established and consistent rules of interpretation, as it would render the special and careful enumeration of the powers which follow the clause unnecessary and improper. “
He went on to warn that an attempt to insert legislation into the clause would set a dangerous precedent and transform the system from, as he put it in Federalist 45, one of “few and certain” powers into one of almost unlimited power.
“Such a view of the Constitution would have the effect of vesting in Congress a general legislative power, instead of the defined and limited one heretofore understood to be theirs, the terms “general defense and general welfare,” embracing every object and action within the scope of a legislative trust. “
EXPANDING POWER
Madison had long advocated authority over “internal improvements,” including proposals of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787. He discussed this in a letter to Reynolds Chapman:
“Perhaps I ought not to omit the remark, that although I agree with the inadequacies of the power in Congress in the matter of internal improvements, it is my abstract opinion that, in the case of Canals especially, the power would properly vest in Congress. It was proposed more than once in the Convention of 1787; & rejected out of apprehensions, chiefly that it might prove an obstacle to the adoption of the constitution.
In his seventh annual message to Congress, he again called for action.
“Among the means of promoting the public interest, the occasion is suitable for recalling the attention of Congress to the great importance of establishing throughout our country roads and canals which can best be executed by the national authority.”
But Madison also included a caveat—use the amendment process to expand Congress’s power to do so.
“It is a happy reflection that every defect of constitutional power which may be met with can be supplied in a manner which the Constitution itself has presciently pointed out.”
Madison repeated his call—and warning—in his eighth and final annual message to Congress.
“In particular, I again invite their attention to the expediency of exercising their existing powers, and, when necessary, resorting to the prescribed mode of extending them, in order to effect a complete system of roads and canals”
The veto ended with a reminder: stick to the limits of the constitution and use the amendment process—the only safe way to authorize additional power:
“I have no choice but to withhold my signature from it, and cherish the hope that its beneficial purposes may be accomplished by recourse for the necessary powers to the same wisdom and virtue in the nation which framed the Constitution in its actual form, and foresight noted in the instrument itself a safe and practical way of improving it, as experience can tell.
A last-minute effort to override Madison’s veto failed.
HONESTY
In his last act as President of the United States, the Father of the Constitution adhered to the Constitution.
One does not even have to agree with James Madison’s view that the “national authority” is the proper place to place this kind of authority to recognize that choosing to follow the oath over one’s personal political goals, especially when the latter would be quite easy to implement – is the type of integrity we should all demand from anyone and everyone in service today.
It’s a high bar, but to build a true “land of the free” instead of the biggest government in history, perhaps “we the people” need to raise our standards.